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EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: IN QUEST




Nearly a decade ago, the United States Supreme Court in McMann
v. Richardson1 held that the sixth amendment right to counsel was a
right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court declared that criminal
defense attorneys must act "within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases, ' ' and that trial judges must "strive ... to
maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys ... in their
courts."3 The Court has not elaborated, however, on what conduct the
right to effective counsel requires of both defense counsel and the trial
judge, or the procedure by which appellate review can best protect it.
Because the Supreme Court has failed to elaborate, lower federal
courts and state courts have taken it upon themselves to establish stan-
dards for determining whether a criminal defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel was protected at trial. The efforts of these courts
have resulted in a medley of standards, ranging from the "mockery of
justice" test to a precise enumeration of attorney duties. Confusion reigns
in the application and interpretation of these standards.
Recently, attempts have been made to define more precisely what
constitutes ineffectiveness of counsel in order to prevent ineffectiveness
t This article is dedicated to the memory of Judge Harold Leventhal, United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, who served as a faculty member of the Notre
Dame Law School Summer London Program in 1979.
* J.D., Indiana University School of Law. Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame
Law School. Faculty member, National Judicial College, University of Nevada-Reno; Na-
tional Institute for Trial Advocacy.
** J.D., Notre Dame Law School. Member, Indiana Bar.
1. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
2. Id. at 771.
3. Id.
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claims from arising and to provide a standard for appellate courts to de-
termine which claims have merit. Several federal and state courts have
adopted new standards to review ineffectiveness-of-counsel claims. These
standards lighten the burden a defendant must carry to prove ineffective-
ness of counsel and thereby overturn his conviction. Despite this recent
trend, however, the standards that courts employ remain varied.
Some commentators have suggested that upgrading the quality of
legal representation would decrease the number of claims relating to the
ineffective assistance of counsel.4 Various educational and professional
programs have been recommended to improve legal representation.5 Im-
provements in the quality of representation, however, will come slowly;
their impact will not be felt for years to come. Meanwhile, criminal defen-
dants continue to bear the burden of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The authors contend that the problem of ineffective assistance of
counsel can only be resolved by establishing a uniform categorical stan-
dard for reviewing ineffective-assistance claims. Standards will prevent
claims from arising as well as provide a standard of review for appellate
courts. This article discusses the constitutional basis of the right to effec-
tive assistance, examines current standards used by the courts in evaluat-
ing ineffectiveness claims, assesses current proposals for rectifying in-
effective representation, and recommends adoption of a "guidelines"
approach as a curative measure.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Supreme Court has indicated on more than one occasion that
the sixth amendment right to the assistance of an attorney is a right to
effective representation.6 Unfortunately, beyond the bare assertion in Mc-
Mann v. Richardson that an indigent defendant is entitled to "reason-
ably competent" advice from his appointed counsel, the Court never has
4. See, eg., Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978 A.B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 105, 105-07.
5. See, e.g., Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A.J.
295, 296 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Upited States v. Morrison, 101 S. Ct. 665, 667 (1981) (Court responsive to
proven claims that governmental conduct has rendered counsel's assistance to the defendant
ineffective); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978) (requiring or permitting a single
attorney to represent co-defendants with divergent interests over timely objection violates
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 53 (1970) (belated appearance of counsel with no prejudice to defendant is not a per se
denial of right to effective assistance of counsel); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970) (Court has long recognized that the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (effective assistance of coun-
sel in a capital case is a constitutional requirement of due process); Von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708, 725 (1948) (sixth amendment right to counsel contemplates services of counsel
devoted solely to interests of his client); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 450 (1940) (mere
formal appointment of counsel does not satisfy constitutional guarantee of assistance of
counsel).
7. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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explained the standard for determining attorney effectiveness. Conse-
quently, the lower courts have looked to the fifth amendment s guarantee
of a procedurally fair trial as well as to the substantive sixth amendment
right to counsel,9 which has resulted in a variety of standards among the
circuits for evaluating effectiveness claims.10
The right to effective assistance of counsel emerged as a corollary to
the basic right to counsel in Powell v. Alabama.1 In Powell the Court
held that due process requires an effective appointment of counsel for an
indigent criminal defendant on trial for a capital offense if he is "incapa-
ble adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like.' 1 2 Significantly, the Court made clear
that a mere pro forma appointment of counsel would not suffice if ap-
pointment would not result in effective aid to the defendant:
It is not enough to assume that counsel thus precipitated into the case
thought there was no defense and exercised their best judgment in pro-
ceeding to trial without preparation. Neither they nor the court could
say what a prompt and thoroughgoing investigation might disclose as to
the facts. No attempt was made to investigate. No opportunity to do so
was given .... The defendants were immediately hurried to trial....
Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not
accorded the right to counsel in any substantial sense.'3
Powell thus laid the foundation for later Court holdings that procedural
practices preventing effective representation, if a right to representation
exists, are unconstitutional.
4
8. The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
9. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
10. See Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 659 (1980); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: A Constitutional Right in Transi-
tion, 10 VAL. L. REv. 509 (1976); Note, Drawing the Line on the Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Defense, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1300 (1980). Justice White, dissenting in the
denial of certiorari in Marzullo v. Maryland, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978), noted that the circuits
were in "disarray" on the issue and that whether a minimum level of competence is neces-
sary to satisfy the sixth amendment is a question of fundamental importance.
11. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12. Id. at 71. In Powell the black defendants were accused of raping two white women.
The trial judge appointed the entire local bar for the purpose of arraignment and expected
that the appointees would continue if no other attorney appeared for the defendants. The
Supreme Court found that counsel appointed provided ineffective assistance to the defen-
dants. Id.
13. Id. at 58.
14. A distinction exists between cases in which the defendant claims a denial of effec-
tive assistance of counsel because of some act or omission by the government's representa-
tives or the trial court's interference with counsel's ability to perform, and those in which he
is claiming to have been represented by an incompetent attorney. Compare United States v.
Morrison, 101 S. Ct. 665 (1981) (Court has been responsive to proven claims that govern-
mental conduct has rendered counsel's assistance to the defendant ineffective), and Hollo-
way v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (single court-appointed attorney required by trial
1981]
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The Court in Powell was concerned with procedural fairness and the
fourteenth amendment15 prohibition against a state's depriving a citizen
of life without affording him due process of law. In Johnson v. Zerbst"
the Court went one step further with respect to indigent defendants in
federal court, holding that "[t]he Sixth Amendment withholds from the
federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to de-
prive an accused of his life or physical liberty unless he ... waives the
assistance of counsel."17 Furthermore, in Glasser v. United States,5 the
court to represent three defendants with conflicting interests could not provide effective
assistance of counsel), and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (right to effective
assistance of counsel denied when the trial court appoints a single attorney to represent two
clients whose interests conflict), with Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (counsel's
failure to evaluate or inform himself of facts giving rise to constitutional claim might result
in advice outside the range of competence for attorneys in criminal cases), and Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (belated appointment of counsel not per se denial of effective
assistance), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (plea of guilty based on rea-
sonably competent advice is not open to attack on ground that counsel might have misjudg-
ed admissibility of confession), and Michael v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1956) (failure of
counsel to object to unconstitutional composition of grand jury does not overcome presump-
tion of effectiveness if attorney experienced and no evidence of incompetence at trial).
15. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides: "No state shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
In Powell the Court said that in certain fact situations, the assistance of counsel was
indispensable to preserve the due process right to a fair hearing
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law ... Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible.... He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
287 U.S. at 68-69.
16. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. Id. at 463.
18. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In Glasser, which involved a conspiracy charge, the trial court
appointed a single attorney to represent two co-defendants after being advised that the de-
fendants had inconsistent, conflicting interests which could not be effectively represented by
the same lawyer. The defendant Glasser contended that by doing so, the trial court "embar-
rassed and inhibited [counsel's] conduct of his [Glasser's] defense in that it prevented
[counsel] from adequately safeguarding Glasser's right to have incompetent evidence ex-
cluded and from fully cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution." Id. at 72. The
Court held that Glasser had been denied "his right to have the effective assistance of coun-
sel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment" and ordered a new trial. The Court concluded
from the record that because the trial court appointed Glasser's attorney to represent his
co-defendants, his attorney's representation "was not as effective as it might have been." Id.
at 76.
The issue in Glasser was whether the trial court had prevented the defendant's attor-
ney from serving him effectively, not whether the attorney himself, in this court-imposed
view of "struggle to serve two masters," had performed his duties incompetently. Id. at 75.
Under these circumstances, the Court held that the defendant need not show that he was
prejudiced, since "the right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and abso-
lute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from
[Vol. 17
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Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel guaranteed effec-
tive assistance of counsel to criminal defendants in federal court.
In Betts v. Brady29 the Court refused to apply the substantive sixth
amendment right to counsel to state criminal cases.20 Consequently, in
state courts, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment contin-
ued to govern whether appointed counsel was required in a given case.
Instead of an absolute guarantee of legal representation, defendants in
state court were constitutionally entitled to an attorney only if specific
circumstances required counsel to insure protection of the defendant's
right to a procedurally fair trial.2' Betts required counsel in state court
proceedings only if the failure to provide representation would result in
"a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of jus-
tice. '22 This standard proved unsatisfactory and ultimately gave way. In
Gideon v. Wainwright23 the Court expressly overruled Betts and held
that the sixth amendment guarantee is an essential element of fourteenth
amendment due process that is binding on the states.' Consequently, due
process prohibited a state court from imprisoning an indigent defendant
on a felony charge unless the court appointed counsel to represent him.25
its denial." Id. at 76. A court's duty to refrain from embarrassing counsel in its conduct of
the defense by insisting or even suggesting that counsel undertake to represent divergent
interests was held to be of equal importance with the court's duty to see to it that the
accused has the assistance of counsel. Id.
19. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. "The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies only to trials in fed-
eral courts. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as
such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment.. . ." 316 U.S. at 461-62.
21. As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and
incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental
ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may
result in a conviction lacking in fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the
amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in
any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not
represented by counsel.
Id. at 473.
22. Id. at 462.
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. The Court held that the right to counsel falls within the category of "immunities
... found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth
Amendment ... valid as against the States." Id. at 342 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
25. Later cases make clear that the right to assistance of counsel applies in any crimi-
nal trial in which the defendant's liberty is at stake. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972) ("absent knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any of-
fense ... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial"). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979) (limiting the right to appointed counsel to proceedings that actually result
in incarceration of the defendant).
The defendant's right to counsel arises at certain "critical stages" in the prosecution
which may affect the conduct of the entire trial. A "critical stage" is a point in the proceed-
ings at which the defendant might irretrievably lose certain rights or defenses which it is the
duty of counsel to protect. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches at pretrial identification after initiation of criminal proceedings against
him); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (defendant entitled to the assistance of coun-
1981]
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The Court never has defined the scope of the sixth amendment right
to effective counsel. The question that has plagued the lower courts is
whether the sixth amendment embodies a particular standard of attorney
conduct that, if not met, would result in the denial of the defendant's
right to counsel. Although it has been clear since Powell that due process
does not permit mere pro forma representation, if counsel is required at
all, the Court had never held until McMann that the sixth amendment
requires a particular level of competence if the requirements of procedu-
ral due process have otherwise been satisfied at trial.2 6 Consequently, the
lower courts have disagreed on whether the proper line of inquiry in deal-
ing with ineffectiveness claims is a fifth amendment analysis which looks
at the overall fairness of the trial or a more absolute sixth amendment
standard.
27
A. The Fifth Amendment Approach
To determine whether a criminal defendant's right to effective coun-
sel has been protected, most jurisdictions initially adopted the fifth
amendment "fair trial" approach, which focused on whether the trial as a
whole was fair to the defendant.28 This approach required the court to
consider any acts or omissions by the defense attorney that were claimed
to have denied the defendant his right to effective assistance of counsel
against this "fair trial" backdrop. The inquiry was not whether the defen-
dant received minimally competent representation, but only whether
counsel's performance was so inept that the defendant was unfairly
prejudiced and therefore was denied his right to due process of law. If
sel at a preliminary hearing even though hearing is not a required stage in prosecution);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967) (defendant entitled to assistance of counsel
at post-indictment pretrial line-up); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (individual
held for questioning by police officers has the right to have counsel present and to have
counsel appointed if he cannot afford his own); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)
(per curiam) (absence of counsel for defendant at preliminary hearing at which he entered a
plea of guilty later introduced in evidence at trial violated his right to due process).
26. See Marzullo v. Maryland, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (denial of
certiorari); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 117-18 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. See generally Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: A Constitutional Right in
Transition, 10 VAL. L. REv. 509, 529-30 (1976); Comment, A Standard for the Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 175, 181 (1978).
28. The "fair trial" rule developed as a corollary to the Court's holding in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969). In Palko the Court attempted to delineate those portions of the Bill of Rights
that were essential to "a scheme of ordered liberty." If a principle of criminal justice-such
as the right to appointed counsel-was not considered "essential," states were free to ad-
minister justice without interference from the federal courts. The distinction between "es-
sential" and "nonessential" principles of due process survives. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972) (unanimous jury not an essential element of due process); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (twelve man jury not a "necessary ingredient" of trial by jury).
29. The "fair trial"/"due process" approach, unlike cases involving more specific con-
stitutional guarantees, inherently requires proof of prejudice. Note, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel: The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 659, 672 (1980). See also Bines, Reme-
dying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59
[Vol. 17
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the reviewing court determined that the defendant got a fair trial despite
his attorney's performance, an unfavorable verdict would not be over-
turned.
The argument against the "fair trial" approach is that it treats a spe-
cific sixth amendment right protected by substantive due process as
merely one element of procedural due process. The Supreme Court has
indicated that a substantial difference exists between the way a reviewing
court treats claims that a defendant has been denied his due process right
to a procedurally fair trial and claims that he has been denied a funda-
mental substantive right.30 Since due process is a less rigid concept than
are the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is subject to a factual
appraisal in each case to determine whether the defendant was
prejudiced.3 1 Even if the reviewing court finds ineffectiveness, other fac-
tors, such as the impartiality of the judge, on balance may show that due
process was satisfied. Unlike specific rights, procedural due process does
not require outright reversal if ineffectiveness is shown.
B. The Sixth Amendment Approach
A claim that a defendant has been denied a fundamental right pro-
tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is entitled
to a stringent standard of review. The sixth amendment approach to inef-
fectiveness claims focuses only on whether incompetent assistance of
counsel at trial effectively denied the defendant his basic sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. The rationale for this approach is that ineffective
representation converts the right to counsel into "a hollow right; 3 2 inef-
fective representation is the same as no representation at all. Other as-
pects of the trial that may have mitigated the prejudicial effect of poor
representation-for example, a fair and competent judge-are irrelevant
since the only issue is whether the defendant was denied a fundamental
sixth amendment right.
A sixth amendment approach, therefore, requires the reviewing court
VA. L. REv. 927, 934-35 (1973); Note, Only Ineffectiveness of Retained Counsel Which is
Known to State Official or Renders Trial "Fundamentally Unfair" Invalidates State Con-
viction, 89 HARv. L. REv. 593, 596 (1975).
30. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31. 316 U.S. at 461-62; see, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542 (1965) ("[i]t is true
that in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations we require a showing of...
prejudice"). The violation of a specific constitutional provision, in contrast, generally does
not require a showing of prejudice. E.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 54 (1970) ("[w]ithin
the context of Sixth Amendment rights, the defendant generally does not have to show that
he was prejudiced by the denial of counsel"); see Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:
The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 678 (1980); Note, Drawing the Line on the
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defense, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1300, 1304 (1980).
32. "The point is elementary that the right to counsel is hollow when counsel is not
effective. The same policies that lie behind the Gideon right to counsel apply with equal
force to the requirement that counsel be effective." Bines, Remedying Ineffective Represen-
tation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927, 935 (1973).
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to identify some minimum level of attorney competence. Most lower
courts have agreed that the sixth amendment embodies a standard of
competence. 3 In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, however, lower
courts have been unable to agree on what that standard should be.
For many years, the Supreme Court had not defined the appropriate
standard of competency. In most of the ineffectiveness cases that reached
the Court, defendants claimed that some act or omission at the trial court
level interfered with appointed counsel's ability to represent the defen-
dant effectively rather than claiming that the attorney was unable, be-
cause of his own incompetence, to present the defendant's case.
34
In McMann v. Richardson,5 however, the Court held that the sixth
amendment entitles the indigent defendant to "reasonably competent ad-
vice.., within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in crimi-
nal cases. '" Furthermore, trial judges were given the responsibility to
maintain standards of competency for attorneys practicing before their
courts. 37 Although McMann seems to suggest that only competent repre-
sentation fulfills the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel, the
Court may have said much less.38 Arguably, "reasonable competence"
means that a defendant is entitled to have his conviction reversed only if
he can demonstrate that his attorney's incompetence prejudiced the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. McMann thus is only a restatement of the
fair trial/"mockery of justice" standard.
In a subsequent case interpreting McMann, the Court made clear
that mere mistakes in judgment by appointed counsel or even failure to
recognize and investigate certain defenses do not necessitate a new trial.39
The Court has never identified or particularized the kind of attorney con-
duct that would fall below the threshold level of minimum competence,
nor has it described the manner in which trial judges are expected to pro-
tect the defendant's right to effective assistance. The burden of interpret-
ing these phrases has been left to the lower federal and state courts.
II. DETERMINING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL-CURRENT
STANDARDS OF REvIEw
A. The "Mockery of Justice" Standard
After Powell, lower courts attempted to define the Supreme Court's
mandate that the sixth amendment required "effective aid" of counsel.
Because the Court did not formulate substantive guidelines to indicate
33. See Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L.
REv. 659, 660-61 (1980).
34. For a discussion of the differences in types of claims, see note 14 supra.
35. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
36. Id. at 771.
37. Id.
38. In McMann the Court stated that the defendant must show gross error by his
attorney in advising the defendant to plead guilty. Id. at 772. It is unclear whether "gross
error," therefore, is the standard to be applied.
39. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
[Vol. 17
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what kind of attorney performance at trial might be deemed ineffective,
lower courts developed the "mockery of justice" standard to deal with the
problem.40 The "mockery of justice" standard is being rejected gradually
by the lower courts, however, and presently is used infrequently.41
The "mockery of justice" standard, despite its vague and imprecise
language, may initially have been intended as a convenient "catch all"
term to encompass a broad spectrum of attorney ineffectiveness. Courts
were allowed to add their own descriptions and gloss to the term.'2 The
40. See, e.g., Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (total failure to present the
case of accused in any fundamental respect); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.) (rep-
resentation so incompetent it becomes duty of court or prosecution to observe and correct),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945); May v. State, 263 Ind. 690, 338 N.E.2d 258 (1975) (absent
glaring and critical omission or succession of omissions evidencing in totality a mockery
of justice, court will not attribute criminal conviction or affirmation to ineffective
representation).
The "mockery of justice" standard is generally traced to Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), overruled, United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d
1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), on remand, Crim. No. 2002-71 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 624 F.2d 300 app.
(D.C. Cir.), aff'd en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Language that is even more descrip-
tive of the term can be found in Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965), "only when
the trial was a farce, or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the re-
viewing court, or the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a
pretense" does ineffectiveness exist. Id. at 704. For a breakdown of federal and state appel-
late standards of review, including jurisdictions currently using the "mockery of justice"
standard, see Charts I & H in the APPENDIX infra.
41. Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (rejects sham and mockery standard;
sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel requires reasonably competent
assistance), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th
Cir. 1978) (en banc) ("mockery of justice" standard rejected; sixth amendment standard of
reasonably competent and effective representation adopted), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974
(1979); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (lst Cir. 1978) (same); Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1977) (rejecting "mockery of justice" standard;
proper test is whether conduct is within range of competence generally found within profes-
sion), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692 (6th
Cir. 1974) (rejecting "mockery of justice" standard; proper inquiry is sixth amendment test
of whether counsel is "reasonably likely to render and renders reasonably effective assis-
tance"); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rejecting "mockery of
justice" standard for "guidelines" approach), on remand, Crim. No. 2002-71 (D.D.C.), reo'd,
624 F.2d 300 app. (D.C. Cir.), aff'd en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (abandoning "farce and mockery" standard for sixth
amendment approach).
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have not specifically rejected the "mockery of justice"
standard, but have interpreted it as requiring a minimum standard of competence. United
States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976) (effective assistance of counsel means "the
customary skills and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney"); United States ex rel.
Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.) (attorney must meet minimum standards of
professional responsibility), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
42. For illustrations of variations, see note 40 supra. The "mockery of justice" stan-
dard has been criticized as too subjective and too reflective of a due process analysis rather
than considering the more stringent requirements of the sixth amendment. See Beasley v.
United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (court abandoned mockery of justice standard in
favor of more stringent analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel). Nevertheless, jurisdic-
tions retaining the standard defend its usefulness and maintain that no alternative is totally
objective in reviewing ineffectiveness claims. See Bucci v. State, 263 Ind. 376, 332 N.E.2d 94
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standard was an outgrowth of the due process/fair trial approach initially
used by courts in reviewing ineffectiveness claims. The focus was not on
the individual instances of ineffectiveness during trial but on the cumula-
tive effect of these instances on the trial as a whole. Only if the cumu-
lative effect cast obvious doubt on the reliability of the verdict was the
trial deemed to be a mockery of justice due to the defense attorney's
ineffectiveness."
The "mockery of justice" standard has been criticized because it
treats the sixth amendment guarantee to effective assistance of counsel as
a procedural due process right and allows courts to overlook specific at-
torney misconduct during trial. Furthermore, under this standard the
burden of proof is on the defendant to show how the alleged instances of
ineffective assistance prejudiced his trial.4' With this burden, the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right is effectively reduced to a minimal proce-
dural due process requirement."
B. The "Malpractice" Standard
After the Court's pronouncement in McMann v. Richardson" that
the defense counsel's conduct must fall "within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,"'47 a majority of the United
States Courts of Appeals and state supreme courts rejected the "mockery
of justice" standard and fashioned a "malpractice" standard based on the
(1975).
The search for objectivity should not obscure common-sense analysis. Indeed, if
objectivity is thought to be that which excludes relativity, we cannot see that the
federal [Sixth Circuit] standard is objective. From the point of view of a sensible
defendant, any and all assistance of counsel which results in a verdict and a
sentence more severe than he wishes is ineffective assistance. We adhere to the
standard consistently followed by our courts for many years.
Id. at -, 332 N.E.2d at 95 (emphasis in original).
43. See, e.g., Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ("combination of circum-
stances, if true, . . . constituted a total failure to present the cause of the accused in any
fundamental respect").
44. The problem with the defendant carrying the burden of proof is not so much the
burden itself but the degree of proof required before relief is given. A trial could be unfair to
the defendant without being farcical or a mockery. One commentator expressed the di-
lemma in this way: it is "specious to define a 'fair trial' as one which is only a little better
than a mockery and a farce, in effect no trial at all." Comment, Incompetency of Counsel,
25 BAYLOR L. REv. 299, 301 (1973). Indiana and a few other states require that the defen-
dant not only show prejudice, but that he overcome a presumption that the defense attor-
ney's representation was competent. "It must be presumed that appellant's attorney dis-
charged his full duty and it should require strong and convincing proof to overcome this
presumption." Schmittler v. State, 228 Ind. 455, -, 93 N.E.2d 184, 191 (1950). See also
United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1981).
45. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 28 (1973)
("mockery of justice" standard "requires such a minimal level of performance from counsel
that it is itself a mockery of the sixth amendment").
46. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
47, Id. at 771. In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), the Court repeated its
"range of competence" mandate.
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McMann "range of competence" language.'8
Although these revised standards improved the review of ineffective-
ness claims, they contained two major flaws. First, because specific in-
stances of attorney misconduct vary from case to case, many courts have
not enumerated which acts or omissions by counsel would fall outside of
the "range of competence." Thus appellate review of attorney misconduct
remains highly subjective. Second, the defendant retains the burden of
showing that his case was adversely affected by his counsel's conduct.' 9
Under the "malpractice" standard, the defendant need not prove that he
was innocent and that the verdict would have been different if he had
received effective assistance of counsel. Instead, he must prove that his
counsel's conduct made the fact-finding process unreliable. This require-
ment partially resurrects the "fair trial" approach used by "mockery of
justice" jurisdictions; the only difference is the degree of proof that the
defendant must bear.
Although the "range of competence" language in the "malpractice"
standard appears to be progressive in guaranteeing sixth amendment
rights, without an enumeration of standards of attorney conduct and
without a revision of the burden of proving prejudice, the change is of
form and not of substance.
C. The "Guidelines" Approach
Realizing that the "mockery of justice" and "malpractice" standards
are inadequate without an enumeration of specific standards of attorney
conduct that is in the "range of competence," several courts have formu-
lated guidelines for defense counsel to follow.50 The guidelines often in-
corporate an American Bar Association (ABA) proposal of standards for
defense counsel.51 Other courts go one step beyond the ABA standards in
48. See, e.g., Drakes v. Wyncik, 640 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1981) (counsel required to exer-
cise customary skill and knowledge prevailing at time and place of trial); Cooper v. Fitzhar-
ris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (reasonably effective and competent defense standard),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634
(7th Cir.) (minimum standard of professional representation required), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 876 (1975). For a breakdown of federal and state jurisdictions using the "malpractice"
standard in its divergent forms, see Charts I & H in the APPENDIX infra.
49. For a detailed discussion of the prejudice issue and a survey of jurisdictions that
have attempted to modify the defendant's burden, see Comment, Current Standards for
Determining Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Still a Sham, Farce or Mockery?, 1979 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 132, 145-48.
50. The Fourth Circuit uses a "guidelines" approach. The guidelines were enunciated
in Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968), and provide:
(1) an attorney must confer with his client as early as possible and as often as necessary; (2)
an attorney must advise his client of the charges against him and of his rights; (3) an attor-
ney must ascertain and develop all appropriate defenses; (4) an attorney must conduct all
necessary investigations; and (5) an attorney must allow time for reflection and preparation.
389 F.2d at 226.
51. The Fourth Circuit's guidelines, for example, were derived from the A.B.A., PRO-
JECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971).
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an effort to inform all parties what conduct constitutes effective assis-
tance of counsel.52 The guidelines define not only acceptable conduct for
the attorney at trial, but also what conduct is required both before and
after trial.
Although there are numerous arguments against the use of the
"guidelines" approach, 53 the clear advantage is that this approach states
what normative conduct comprises effective assistance in every criminal
case. The "mockery of justice" and "malpractice" standards do not define
this conduct, and the reviewing court must struggle on a case-by-case
basis to find a minimal competence level. Thus, predictable outcomes
upon review and qualitative controls over attorney conduct are sacrificed.
D. The "Harmless Error" Approach
All fifty states50 and the federal system have a "harmless error"
provision which prohibits appellate reversals based on errors that do not
52. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), on remand, Crim.
No. 2002-71 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 624 F.2d 300 app. (D.C. Cir.), afl'd en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). In DeCoster Judge Bazelon urged all courts to use the ABA proposal as a guide-
line to articulate duties which defense counsel has an affirmative duty to perform for his
client. The duties Judge Bazelon includes in his opinion are: (1) the duty to confer with the
client as promptly and as often as necessary to elicit all information about matters of de-
fense; (2) the duty to discuss with the client all potential strategies and tactical choices; (3)
the duty to promptly advise the client of his rights, and prompt action on the part of coun-
sel to preserve those rights; (4) the duty to be concerned with the client's release from cus-
tody, as well as the duty to conduct necessary pretrial examinations; and (5) the duty to
conduct factual and legal investigations. Id. at 1203-04. See also Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d
224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). For a breakdown of federal and state
courts using the "guidelines" approach, see Charts I & H in the APPENDIX infra.
53. Appellate courts have avoided using the "guidelines" approach for various reasons.
The foremost argument against it arises from the fear that if more conduct-specific stan-
dards were applied, a larger number of convictions would be reversed. For further discussion
of this criticism, see text accompanying notes 103-06 infra. It should be noted, however, that
though a short-term deluge of appeals and claims might occur, the application of the
"guidelines" approach would have the long-term effect of reducing the number of claims.
Once clear and concise standards of conduct are announced, both defendants and their at-
torneys will know what the sixth amendment requires.
The reluctance of appellate courts to implement more definitional standards may also
stem from the "club mentality," under which courts equate a claim for ineffective assistance
with a smear on a particular counsel's reputation. In Angarano v. United States, 312 A.2d
295 (D.C. 1973), Judge Nebecker said that an ineffectiveness claim "is not a device to be
used on appeal except in the most severe cases of glaring ineptitude .... [T]his area of
challenge to a conviction must be thus limited so as not to pose an unwarranted professional
hazard to the bar who must defend in those cases ... ." Id. at 300. The "club mentality"
problem would be overcome if courts could be persuaded that the finding of ineffective as-
sistance is not a judgment on the overall competence of the attorney, but of a particular
instance of ineffective representation. Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals suggested that the term "ineffective assistance of counsel" be changed to a
phrase less derogatory to the defense attorney. "Failure of the criminal process" was one
such suggestion. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811, 823
(1976).
54. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
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affect the substantial rights of the criminal defendant. In Chapman v.
California" the United States Supreme Court extended the harmless er-
ror principle to constitutional errors, saying that "there may be some con-
stitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unim-
portant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless." 57 The Chapman Court further held
that the substantive standard for determining whether an error was con-
stitutionally harmless was a matter of federal rather than state law.5" In
Chapman the California state court applied a "harmless error" standard
that placed primary emphasis upon the presence of other substantive evi-
dence which showed that proof of guilt was overwhelming.59 The Supreme
Court stressed that the standard should emphasize the impact of the er-
ror upon the "substantial rights" of the defendants. 0 Accordingly, the
Court held that a constitutional error could be viewed as harmless only if
the beneficiary of the error, the state, proves "beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.
61
The Chapman Court acknowledged that earlier cases such as Gideon
v. Wainwright 2 had indicated that "there are some constitutional rights
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harm-
less error."63 Although Chapman recognized that failure to appoint coun-
sel would be harmful per se, the Court did not attempt to define what
conduct by counsel would constitute a denial of the sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel. The lower courts were left to de-
cide whether the Chapman "harmless error" rule or the "automatic rever-
sal" rule (error harmful per se) should be applied."
56. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
57. Id. at 22.
58. "Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord
federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much a matter of a federal question
as what particular constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and
whether they have been denied." Id. at 21.
59. People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 P.2d 209, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1965), rev'd sub
nom. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
60. 386 U.S. at 22.
61. Id. at 24.
62. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon the Court held that a state's failure to appoint
counsel in a noncapital criminal case deprived the indigent defendant of due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 344.
63. 386 U.S. at 23.
64. In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), the Supreme Court held that arraign-
ment was a critical stage in a state's criminal process and that counsel was needed at that
time to protect the defendant's rights. The Court further concluded that the degree of
prejudice "can never be known" because only counsel present at the time "could have ena-
bled the accused to know all defenses available to him and to plead intelligently." Id. at 55.
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), however, the Court refused to adopt a per se
rule requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy appointment of counsel. It em-
phasized an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the tardy appoint-
ment. The rejection of the per se rule by the Chambers Court does not bar a court from
recognizing a prima facie presumption of ineffective assistance upon a showing of tardy ap-
pointment. With this presumption, the burden then is shifted to the prosecution to show
1981]
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As a result of the Supreme Court's benign neglect of the issue of
prejudice in ineffectiveness claims, lower courts continue to grant relief
only if the defendant can show prejudice. Unlike Chapman, however,
most courts hold that the defendant, not the state, has the burden of
proof. 5 The Eighth Circuit, for example, in attaching the burden of prov-
ing prejudice to a "mockery of justice" standard stated: "[T]he mockery
standard was not intended... [to] be taken literally, but rather... [to]
be employed as an embodiment of the principle that a petitioner must
shoulder a heavy burden in proving unfairness."6 Prejudice is found only
if the petitioner's allegations of ineffectiveness are coupled with colorable
claims of innocence.6 7 If the verdict would not have been affected, the
"harmless error" rule dictates that relief be restricted to cases in which
the allegedly unconstitutional conduct prejudiced the outcome of the
trial.68
At odds with the Eighth Circuit's standard is the standard employed
by the Fourth Circuit. In Coles v. Peyton"' the court stated that counsel's
failure to abide by specific guidelines enunciated by the court "consti-
tute[d] a denial of effective representation of counsel unless the state...
[could] establish lack of prejudice thereby. 7 0 Efforts to go one step be-
yond Coles by reversing a conviction, regardless of a showing of prejudice,
once allegations of ineffectiveness have been proved have failed.7 1 The per
that the late appointment did not result in prejudice to the defendant. Garland v. Cox, 472
F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1973). The late appointment of counsel is a common ground for attacking
effectiveness of counsel. In Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
849 (1968), the court held that competent assistance of counsel necessarily requires ade-
quate time for preparation, including appropriate legal and factual investigation of all possi-
ble defenses.
Notwithstanding the holding in Chambers, the Court has approved a per se rule of
ineffective assistance in cases in which the same attorney represented two defendants whose
interests were clearly in conflict. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). But cf. Mor-
gan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110 (2nd Cir. 1968) (suggesting that reversal unnecessary if
conflict too minimal to have affected result).
65. See generally Flynn, Adequacy of Counsel: The Emerging Fair Trial Issue for the
Seventies?, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 19 (Jan. 1975).
66. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974).
67. See generally Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 142 (1970).
68. Id. at 170.
69, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). For the standards enun-
ciated in Coles, see note 50 supra.
70, 389 F.2d at 226. In accord with this decision is Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730 (3d Cir. 1970), in which the Court abandoned its presumption of prejudice arising from
late appointment of counsel and shifted the burden to the state to show the absence of
prejudice. The court held that a showing of late appointment presents strong evidence of
prejudice. Id. at 735-37.
71. E.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979). In Cooper the court overruled a prior decision in which it had held that
if a petitioner carried the burden of establishing the overall ineffectiveness of counsel, his
conviction must be reversed without any further showing of prejudice. Cooper v. Fitzharris,
551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled en banc, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979).
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se rule of prejudice is applied only if counsel is not provided at all or is
prevented somehow from performing his adversarial function.
7 2
Unless the Supreme Court rules that a substantiated claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel is a per se violation of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights, the "harmless error" rule will continue to be used by federal
and state appellate courts. In light of this reality, the lower appellate
courts should realize that the burden of proof places an undue hardship
on the defendant.
7 3
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT STANDARDS-PROCEDURES TO PROTECT
THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
The ineffective assistance of counsel claim in its various forms 4 may
be raised at several points during the criminal proceeding, but it is usu-
ally raised on appeal. None of the procedural alternatives sufficiently pro-
tect the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Initially, the claim may be raised at the trial level by a motion for
mistrial. This procedure is rarely used, since the defense counsel is not
likely to attack his own performance with such a motion. The next oppor-
tunity for the defendant's claim to be heard is on direct appeal of the
conviction. Appellate courts are, however, by their nature, in the position
to give remedial relief to such claims only after an extended period of
time has lapsed since the defendant has received the ineffective assis-
tance. It is the trial court, however, that has the initial view of claims of
ineffectiveness and the power and responsibility to eliminate or cure in-
stances of ineffectiveness when they arise. The question from the bench,
"Is the defense ready?" can no longer substitute for the trial court's duty
to make sure that the defense counsel has adequately completed factual
and legal investigations of a case before it comes to trial. Although an
appellate finding of ineffectiveness would result in a reversal of the con-
viction and a new trial, the major difficulty with appellate review of inef-
fectiveness claims is that the reviewing court is limited to the evidence as
it appears in the trial record. Often that record has been inadequately
made by the same counsel whose effective trial representation is at
issue.
7 5
72. 586 F.2d at 1332.
73. The burden of proof issue is analyzed in Judge Bazelon's majority opinion in
United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (DeCoster I), on remand, Crim.
No. 2002-71 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 624 F.2d 300 app. (D.C. Cir.), aff'd en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). Note, however, that this portion of.Bazelon's opinion in DeCoster I was modified
by United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (DeCoster III), in an opinion by
the late Judge Leventhal.
74. Various terms have been used to designate the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel. For a discussion of terminology as applied to this issue, see Albert & Brody, Ineffective
Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1 (1977).
75. See generally Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground
for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 290 (1964); see also
Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. REV. 483, 499
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Because of the drawbacks to motions at trial and direct appeals, the
majority of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims arise during post-con-
viction proceedings collaterally attacking the conviction, such as petitions
for a writ of habeas corpus.7 6 In filing a petition for the writ, the defen-
dant must allege that he was denied his sixth amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel during his trial.77 At an evidentiary hearing on
the claim, the court considers not only the trial record but other extrinsic
evidence as well. 78 If the court finds enough specific examples of ineffec-
tiveness on the part of defense counsel, a more extensive hearing on the
claim may follow." If the hearing reveals further evidence of sixth
amendment infringement and resulting prejudice to the defendant's case,
the writ issues and the defendant is released from prison.80 If the state
decides not to proceed with a new trial, the defendant remains free.81
Habeas corpus proceedings have been criticized, however, because of their
(1976).
76. The Indiana Supreme Court, which retains the mockery of justice standard for
ineffectiveness claims, strongly criticized the use and abuse of habeas corpus proceedings to
review incompetency claims, especially if the ineffectiveness claim has already been heard
on direct appeal. In Langley v. State the court said:
While we concede to no less than a profound concern for the maintenance of
strict adherence to the notion of fundamental fairness and due process through-
out the course of a criminal proceeding, it might at the same time be admitted
that our seemingly over indulgent attitude towards the preservation of a crimi-
nal defendant's "rights" has been prompted by the increasingly liberal manner
in which the federal courts have interpreted the extent of their jurisdiction in
such matters. A cursory reading of such cases as Townsend v. Sain. . . and Fay
v. Noia . . . demonstrates the relative ease with which a duly convicted felon
may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts on a petition for habeas corpus,
thereby placing the very integrity of a state's criminal proceeding in question.
Clearly, then, it may be said that one of the functions of our post conviction
remedy rules is to preserve what sanctity remains to this state's disposition of a
criminal charge by allowing a convicted criminal defendant ample opportunity to
present claims for relief in the courts of this state before resort must be had to
the federal courts.
256 Ind. 199, -, 267 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (1971). The Indiana Court's complaint of Fay v.
Noia was remedied by the decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), in which the
Supreme Court reversed an order of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals requiring a hearing
in the Florida state courts on the habeas corpus petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Court held that a federal habeas corpus review would be barred absent a show-
ing of "cause" and "prejudice" attendant to a state procedural waiver. Id. at 90-91. For the
"cause" and "prejudice" test used in Sykes, see Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542
(1976).
For a discussion of the attitudes of courts upon reviewing habeas corpus proceedings in
which the ineffectiveness of counsel claim is raised, see Bines, Remedying Ineffective Repre-
sentation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927 (1973);
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?-Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 142 (1970).
77. See generally 6 WEsT's FED. PRAC. MANUAL § 6801 (1970 & Supp. 1980).
78. Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on
"The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1962).
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relative ineffectiveness in curtailing the number of claims made on this
issue.
8 2
Alternatives to habeas corpus relief exist for the misrepresented
criminal defendant. The defendant may bring a malpractice suit under
state tort law or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides for a civil cause
of action if the plaintiff has been deprived of constitutional rights.8 3 The
malpractice suit can be brought only after the defendant's trial, however,
and is not remedial of his own right to a fair trial. Moreover, the de-
fendant-turned-plaintiff faces a heavy burden of proving in either suit
that his attorney was ineffective.8 4 Finally, if the defendant-turned-plain-
tiff is indigent, he can ill-afford the legal costs of suing his former defense
attorney.8 5 Another suggested alternative is disciplinary action by the lo-
cal bar association against the defense attorney.86 The greatest problem
with this approach is that the bar's standards are advisory and do not
offer any direct relief for the defendant except, perhaps, in the form of
vindication .
7
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Two different approaches are necessary to deal with the problem of
ineffective assistance of counsel. First, measures must be undertaken that
prevent claims of ineffectiveness from ever arising. Educational programs
and standards of attorney conduct are two notable examples. The second
approach provides means by which appellate courts can analyze the merit
of ineffectiveness claims. Guidelines, for example, may aid a court in de-
termining whether counsel has fulfilled his duty to his client. Although
some overlap is inherent in these two approaches, each category is consid-
ered separately to facilitate discussion.
A. Preventative Measures
Three different preventative measures have emerged: (1) self-disci-
82. See, e.g., Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Depar-
tures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927, 959-70 (1973).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). For general discussions of malpractice suits, see Gard,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. REv. 483, 499
(1976); Zilly, Recent Developments in Legal Malpractice Litigation, 6 LITIGATION 8 (1979).
84. See McCord v. Barley, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (legal standards for ineffec-
tive counsel same as for malpractice).
85. The Supreme Court has eliminated one obstacle to the defendant-turned-plain-
tiff's suit against his court-appointed attorney. Some circuit courts had offered court-ap-
pointed counsel absolute immunity from malpractice lawsuits. White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d
276, 280 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court held recently that federal common law
immunity available to other court officials does not extend to court-appointed lawyers. Ferri
v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
86. See Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L.
REV. 483, 499 (1976).
87. See, e.g., In re Eldridge, 530 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. 1975) (Eighth Circuit struck defense
attorney's name from role of practicing attorneys for failing to file habeas corpus petition
properly; Missouri Supreme Court only issued reprimand).
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pline by members of the bar and adherence to rules of professional con-
duct;88 (2) the specialization approach, which would set up separate re-
quirements for lawyers wishing to do trial work;8 ahid (3) the continuing
education approach, which would require all lawyers to attend a pre-
scribed number of legal courses and seminars each year to update their
knowledge of the law. 0
In his Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980 before the
American Bar Association,"" Chief Justice Burger shed some light on the
need for preventative measures to ensure attorney competence. Reviewing
legal education of the 1970's, standards for admission to the bar, regula-
tion of the bar, and the relationship of these factors to the quality of
lawyers' performance in the trial courts, the Chief Justice concluded that
a "serious problem" still exists in terms of the quality of some lawyers'
88. See Discussion Draft of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 48 U.S.L.W.
No. 32 (February 19, 1980). The Discussion Draft has not been approved by the House of
Delegates and thus does not represent the views of the ABA. The Draft has been circulated
for comment and is subject to further study and revision. Section 1.1 (Competence), states:
"[A] lawyer shall undertake representation only in matters in which the lawyer can act with
adequate competence. Adequate competence includes the specific legal knowledge, skill, effi-
ciency, thoroughness, and preparation employed in acceptable practice by lawyers undertak-
ing similar matters." Id. at 3. The section then gives lengthy definitions to each of these
attributes of competence and comments.
89. For a discussion of the specialization approach advocated by Chief Justice Burger,
see Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of
Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. R.V. 227 (1973). Justice
Burger points out three causes of inadequate performance in trial advocacy: (1) the assump-
tion that every person admitted to the bar is qualified to give effective assistance on every
kind of legal problem that arises; (2) the failure of law schools to provide adequate and
systematic programs by which students may focus on the elementary skills of advocacy; and
(3) the inability of prosecutor and public defender offices to provide the same kind of ap-
prenticeships for their new lawyers as are provided by large law firms. Id. at 231-32.
Chief Justice Burger proposes a four-point program as a first step in specialist qualifica-
tion: (1) rejection of the notion that admission to the bar connotes competence to be an
advocate in trial courts in matters of serious competence; (2) postponement of broad and
comprehensive specialty certification until positive progress has been achieved in the spe-
cialty of trial advocacy; (3) development of means to evaluate qualifications of lawyers com-
petent to render the effective assistance of counsel in the trial of cases; and (4) enlistment of
the various professional legal associations in an effort to collaborate in prompt and concrete
steps to accomplish a workable, enforceable certification of trial advocates. Id. at 240-41.
90. See Wolkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 574 (1975).
Mandatory continuing legal education programs would require the attorney to attend a pre-
scribed number of classroom hours annually. The mandatory system, however, would fail to
discriminate among lawyers in terms of their relative competence and would not relate the
required course content to the individual lawyer's needs. Id. at 576.
A better solution, suggests Wolkin, would be a bar-operated system of monitoring the
individual lawyer's professional competence. The monitoring agency would be empowered to
investigate complaints of incompetence, to determine whether a basis for them existed, and
to prescribe and require remedial measures. This system would address its attention to the
incompetent lawyer, rather than to the lawyer who is constantly updating his legal skills and
education. Id. at 574-77. For a further discussion of these views, see Wolkin, More on a
Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 1064 (1975).
91. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A.J. 295
(1980).
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performance in trial courts. 9 2 The Chief Justice did, however, acknowl-
edge efforts to deal with this problem: a re-examination of the standards
of professional conduct by the Association; the expansion of existing pro-
grams of training and creation of new ones by the nation's law schools;
and the Judicial Conference of the United States' exploration of the need
for standards for admission to practice in the federal courts and its devel-
opment of pilot projects to test these standards.
93
In a 1979 report, the Committee to Consider Standards for Admis-
sion to Practice in Federal Courts" called for an expansion of the contin-
uing education approach to provide minimum competence for federal
trial practice.9 The Committee recommended: (1) formation of perform-
ance review committees in each judicial district to deal with cases of al-
leged incompetence by lawyers already admitted to federal practice; (2)
adoption of district rules to provide opportunities for second and third
year law students to participate under supervision in case preparation
and trial; (3) formation by the Judicial Conference of a standing commit-
tee on federal court admission to promote uniform national standards
and monitor testing methods and continuing legal education; (4) clarifica-
tion of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility provisions that relate
to trial work; (5) a requirement that an attorney seeking to practice in
federal courts pass a federal law bar examination in addition to state bar
exams; and (6) a requirement that an attorney have at least four previous
"trial experiences" to qualify for federal court appearances.9
The Committee's report was accepted unanimously by the Judicial
Conference, and an implementation committee has been created to insti-
tute pilot programs in several federal districts.9'7 Pilot programs were in-
stituted so that the Judicial Conference could test the necessity for, and
the value of, special admissions standards. 8
B. Curative Measures
Although preventative measures are necessary to ensure long-term
92. Id. at 296.
93. Id.
94. The committee is chaired by Chief Judge Devitt of the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota.
95. Final Report of the Committee to Consider Standards for Practice in the Federal
Courts, from the Devitt Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, released
September 19-20, 1979 for comment, and officially adopted by the Judicial Conference as
reported in The National Law Journal, Monday, October 8, 1979, at 20. See also Devitt,
Improving Federal Trial Advocacy, 16 JUDGES J. 40 (1977).
96. 64 A.B.A.J. 1650, 1650-51 (1978). "Trial experiences" could include law school trial
advocacy course participation, second chairing, observing, or actually participating at real
trials. At least two of these "trial experiences" would have to be in actual trials. Id. at 1650.
97. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A.J. 295, 296
(1980). For a criticism of the Devitt Committee Report, see Otorowski, Some Fundamental
Problems with the Devitt Committee Report, 65 A.B.A.J. 713 (1979).
98. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A.J. 295, 296
(1980).
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solutions for ineffective assistance problems, they do not provide needed
short-term relief to defendants suffering from the present effects of attor-
ney ineffectiveness. Curative measures taken by some appellate courts in
the form of specific guidelines of competent conduct provide some of this
relief.
A recent decision in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
United States v. DeCoster,9 9 illustrates the two schools of thought in this
area. The "categorical" approach advocates using rigid guidelines and
would shift to the government the burden of proving that ineffectiveness
was harmless to the defendant. 100 The "judgmental" approach, on the
other hand, maintains that ineffectiveness claims should be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis and would leave the burden of showing prejudice, as
well as ineffectiveness, on the defendant.1"
1. Use of guidelines
The proponents of the judgmental approach suggest that the use of
guidelines will eventually encourage the prosecution and trial judge to in-
terfere with the conduct and tactical decisions of defense counsel.102 They
argue that a "defense attorney's function consists, in large part, of the
application of professional judgment to an infinite variety of decisions in
the development and prosecution of the case."' 03 Thus a court "must be
wary lest its inquiry and standards undercut the sensitive relationship
between attorney and client and tear the fabric of the adversary sys-
tem."'104 The proponents of the judgmental approach argue that the
guidelines used by the proponents of the categorical approach were not
developed to be minimum standards for the practitioner. Rather, they are
recommendations formulated to guide the attorney in the representation
of his client.105 Thus the judgmentalists conclude that "generalized stan-
dards may be little more than a 'semantic merry-go-round'. . . [The end
result is that] courts will condemn only a performance that is egregious
and probably prejudicial."106
99. 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The opinion of the court, delivered by Judge
Leventhal, represents one school of thought while the dissenting opinion of Judge Bazelon
represents the other.
100. See, e.g., id. at 245 (Robinson, J., concurring in result); id. at 264 (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting). It should be noted that Judge Robinson introduced a hybrid of the pure cate-
gorical approach. He rejects the premise that the guidelines do any more than illustrate
"contemporary thought on what a competent performance should offer." Id. at 250 n.44.
(Robinson, J., concurring in result). He accepts the premise that once a showing of compe-
tence has been made, the burden shifts to the government to show the infirmity harmless.
Id. at 260-61.
101. Id. at 214-17.
102. Id. at 208. For a discussion of other arguments against the "guidelines" approach,
see note 53 supra.
103. 624 F.2d at 203.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 205.
106. Id. (quoting A.B.A., PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 11 (Approved Draft 1971)).
[Vol. 17
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Categoricalists, on the other hand, argue that the guidelines are nec-
essary to "provide the court with an objective basis for assessing the ade-
quacy of representation.' 10 7 Conceding that "inevitably there will be dis-
parities in the quality of representation,"' 18 they argue that the sixth
amendment guarantees to every defendant in a criminal proceeding a cer-
tain minimum level of competent legal representation. 09 Categoricalists
argue that there are certain legal tasks defined by the guidelines that can
never be ignored.l" 0 They reject the notion that guidelines are "merely
'aspirational,' ""' and they do not find offensive the intrusion of a trial
judge, who has the "ultimate responsibility for ensuring the accused re-
ceives a fair trial, with all the attendant safeguards of the Bill of
Rights,"" 2 when the object of the intrusion is to forestall ineffective rep-
resentation." 3 Categoricalists, of course, concede that "counsel's conduct
must be evaluated in the context of a particular case and that not every
deviation from a perfect or even average performance makes out a claim
of ineffectiveness." 1 4 Nonetheless, they conclude that if the guidelines
are breached and the breach is substantial, 5 the defendant has a consti-
107. 624 F.2d at 277 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 266 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 276 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). On this point both schools of thought agree,
though they articulate different minimums. The proponents of the judgmental approach feel
that the "claimed inadequacy must be a serious incompetency that falls measurably below
the performance of fallible lawyers." Id. at 208. In contrast, the proponents of the cate-
gorical approach would condemn any conduct that falls below that to be expected from a
"reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent, conscientious advocate." Id. at 267
(Bazelon, J., dissenting). See also United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (initially articulating this standard), on remand, Crim. No. 2002-71 (D.D.C.), rev'd,
624 F.2d 300 app. (D.C. Cir.), aff'd en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
110. Judge Bazelon includes among these certain tasks: "conferring with the client
without delay and as often as necessary; fully discussing potential strategies and tactical
choices; advising the client of his rights and taking all actions necessary to preserve them;
and conducting appropriate factual and legal investigations." United States v. DeCoster, 624
F.2d 196, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 276 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 298.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 281-82.
115. The test ascribed to by the proponents of the categorical approach was developed
initially by Judge Bazelon in United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1973), on
remand, Crim. No. 2002-71 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 624 F.2d 300 app. (D.C. Cir.), aff'd en banc, 624
F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The test is three-pronged: (1) Did counsel violate one of the
articulated duties? (2) Was the violation "substantial"? and (3) Has the government demon-
strated that the infirmity was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? Id. at 275. Judge
Bazelon's failure to explicitly define "substantial" in this initial articulation of the test cre-
ated some confusion. See, e.g., United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring); United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(suggesting that the term contemplates a showing of the breach of a duty by counsel as well
as a showing of prejudice to the defendant). Judge Bazelon clarified this ambiguity when he
stated that the violation of one of the articulated duties is substantial unless "excusable" or
"justifiable." He defined "excusable" and "justifiable," to make clear that the categorical
approach does not contemplate a showing of prejudice. Id. at 282 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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tutionally cognizable claim of ineffective assistance.11
2. Burden of proof
The far more controversial and fundamental difference between the
categorical and judgmental approaches lies in the allocation of the burden
of proving incompetence. The proponents of the judgmental approach im-
pose upon the defendant the burden of not only showing ineffectiveness,
but also prejudice. 117 The judgmentalists focus on the consequences of an
alleged failure in effective representation.118 Although some claims of in-
effective assistance do constitute a denial of the right to the assistance of
counsel, other claims, though amounting to the denial of the right to a
fair trial, fall short of a denial of the right to the assistance of counsel.119
A claim that the right to a fair trial has been denied, unlike a claim of
ineffectivness, requires that prejudice be shown. 20 Since claims of ineffec-
tiveness based on incompetence or unwillingness do not, in the view of
judgmentalists, rise to the level of a denial of effective representation, an
additional burden is imposed upon the defendant. In support of this posi-
tion, the judgmentalists rely on Supreme Court and lower court prece-
dent." They argue that if the defendant seeking to overturn a conviction
has access to the information required to show prejudice, he rightfully
should be required to shoulder the burden.1 22 Finally, they argue that
the government should not be required "to disprove the existence of
prejudice" if "scanty evidence" of ineffective representation exists.
123
Otherwise, judgmentalists say, "an almost impenetrable obstacle to sus-
taining convictions [is created] . .. [which] would lead to highly objec-
tionable intrusions into the adversary system.
M 24
Proponents of the categorical approach would, upon a showing of
116. 624 F.2d at 282 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
117. Even judgmentalists disagree on exactly what is required of a defendant to show
prejudice. Although some feel that actual prejudice must be shown, others would require
only a showing of substantial prejudice, and still others would require only a showing of
likely prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 206 (1976) ("counsel's
deficiency 'likely' deprived him of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defense")
(citing Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974)); Bruce v.
United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (1967) ("incompetence ... has in effect blotted out the
essence of a substantial defense"); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 424-25, 590 P.2d 859, 865-
66, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 738-39 (1979) ("counsel's acts or omissions related in the withdrawal
of a potentially meritorious defense"). Those who support a requirement of showing only
likely prejudice find the more relaxed standard appropriate because without it they are "se-
riously troubled by the likelihood of injustice." 624 F.2d at 206.
118. 624 F.2d at 208.
119. Compare id. at 200-02 with id. at 222 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). The propo-
nents of the judgmental approach agree on the question of classification. They differ, how-
ever, on the parameters to be used in the classification.
120. Id. at 200-02.
121. See, e.g., id.
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failure of counsel in some substantial respect, presume prejudice and im-
pose upon the government the burden of demonstrating that the infirmity
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.125 The categoricalists focus on
"the quality of counsel's performance, ' 1 2 6 rather than on the conse-
quences of counsel's actions. Categoricalists hold as their staff the sixth
amendment itself,1 27 arguing that the failure of counsel in any substantial
respect constitutes a constructive denial of the right to counsel 28 which,
in turn, engages analysis of the sixth amendment "right to counsel. 1 29 In
support of this position, they, like the proponents of the judgmental ap-
proach, cite persuasive authority.130 They also champion the cause of the
indigent defendant, arguing that "[i]f the Sixth Amendment is to serve a
central role in eliminating second-class justice for the poor, then it must
proscribe second-class performances by counsel, whatever the conse-
quences in a particular case."131s Conceding that there may be some cases
in which an appellate court can accurately gauge prejudice, 3 2 the categor-
icalists assert that prejudice to the defendant may take many forms 33
and thus will often be "incapable of any sort of measurement."' 2 ' To im-
pose the burden of showing prejudice on a defendant is, they say, "to...
condition the right to effective assistance of counsel on the defendant's
125. Judge Bazelon sums up the essence of the categorical approach as follows:
All that the accused must show to establish a Sixth Amendment violation is that
the counsel's acts or omissions were substantially enough to have deprived him
of the effective assistance of counsel in his defense. He need not prove that
counsel's violations were ultimately harmful in affecting the outcome of his trial.
Quite simply, the inquiry into the adequacy of counsel is distinct from the in-
quiry into guilt or innocence. The Constitution entitled every defendant to coun-
sel who is "an active advocate in behalf of his client." Where such advocacy is
absent, the accused has been denied effective assistance regardless of his guilt or
innocence.
Id. at 288 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). See also id. at 300 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 275 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 265-66, 275-76.
128. "Indeed, ineffective assistance is not far removed from total lack of assistance
." Id. at 260 (Robinson, J., concurring in result).
129. Proof of prejudice is generally not a condition precedent to establishing the con-
travention of a right specifically enumerated in the Constitution. This includes the sixth
amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. In contrast, most cases involving
claims of due process deprivations require a showing of prejudice. For a discussion of these
differences, see notes 30 & 31 supra and accompanying text.
130. See United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 250-58 (1976) (Robinson, J., concur-
ring in result); id. at 288-93 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 275 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon emphasizes what the categori-
cal approach can offer to the indigent defendant. Id. at 295-300. Claims of ineffective assis-
tance, however, are not confined to the context of appointed counsel. All persons standing
accused in a criminal prosecution, whether indigent or paying clients, have the right to the
effective assistance of competent counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71
(1970). The categorical approach applies with equal force to indigents and paying clients.
132. See United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 293 (1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., id.
134. Id. at 292 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162,
168 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
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ability to demonstrate his innocence,' 1 35 a position that clearly is incon-
sistent with our system of criminal justice. 3 6 "'[T]he right to have the
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to




Although some reforms already have been instituted to prevent the
incompetence of counsel, they have fallen short of providing specific relief
to victimized defendants. Specialization requirements, for example, unless
made retroactive, would not affect trial lawyers already in practice. Fur-
thermore, neither specialization nor continuing education requirements
would eliminate ineffectiveness claims arising from attorney indifference
or overwork, 38 nor would these proposals reach lawyers who persist in
providing poor representation due to bad character, laziness, or apathy.
In 1978, the American Bar Foundation asked judges from across the
country for their opinion of performances by counsel in their court-
rooms.13 9 The report indicated that lack of trial preparation was the most
frequently cited area of incompetence. 40 To deal with incompetence of
135. Id. at 288-89 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
136. Id. The presumption of innocence is basic to our system of criminal law. See
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
137. United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 292-93 (1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting)
(quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)).
138. See Passmore v. Estelle, 594 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1979) (attorney submitted one
sentence appellate brief); Thomas v. State, 251 Ind. 546, 242 N.E.2d 919 (1969) (conviction
reversed because of inadequate representation of indigent defendant by public defender).
For detailed listings of specific attorney conduct that has been held that ineffective, see
Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 16 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 67 (1978); Annot., 26
A.L.R. Fed. 218 (1976).
139. Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978 A.B. FoUN-
DATION RESEARCH J. 105 (1978). The survey included over 1400 judges of general jurisdiction
in state and federal courts. The judges who responded reflect the general geographic distri-
bution, types of caseloads, and law school origins of the United States judiciary. Id. at 111-
14. Maddi explored demographic and other variables that might have accounted for varia-
tion in these judgments; in relatively few instances, however, were these extrinsic factors
related to evaluations of advocacy competence. Id. at 130-37.
The survey was undertaken in response to a general concern within the bar about the
level of competence of trial lawyers. E.g., Burger, Remarks on Trial Advocacy: A Proposi-
tion, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 15 (1967). Initiated and carried out before recent public debate and
speculation focused on the statistics of incompetency, its purpose was to examine what
judges perceived to be the quality of trial advocacy. Maddi, supra, at 107-09. The survey
was directed at judges as principal observers of trial attorneys in action and as potential
critics of their performance. Id. at 108.
140. Maddi, supra note 139, at 125. In the survey, judges were asked to consider all
trial attorneys who appeared before them in the year before the survey and to rate those
attorneys on a scale ranging from "exceptionally competent" to "predominantly incompe-
tent." In addition, judges were asked to rate, on the same basis, plaintiffs' attorneys and
defendants' attorneys in each of their five most recent trials. Almost 87% of those specific
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trial advocates, judges often provided advice and rebuke in chambers.141
Few had ever instituted formal disciplinary action based on incompe-
tence. 42 Judges who advocated certification of trial specialists and re-
quired apprenticeship to ensure the competence of the trial bar gave
more negative assessments of the competence of counsel than those who
did not. 43 The report indicated, however, that few trial advocates actu-
ally performed incompetently. Thus, the report suggested using expanded
disciplinary measures to deal with instances of incompetence on a case-
by-case basis rather than instituting more general measures that would
burden the entire system.
144
Trial courts, however, rarely take a direct hand in the investigation
of defense counsel preparation or potential for effective representation at
trial." Moreover, appellate courts are reluctant to reverse a decision on a
claim that the trial court did not proscribe the harmful actions or omis-
sions of defense counsel.'4 Yet, it is the trial court that must first ex-
trial performances were rated minimally competent or better. Id. at 118.
141. Id. at 129.
142. Id. at 130.
143. Id. at 140-41. When asked whether the quality of trial advocacy had changed
during the judge's tenure on the bench, 32% observed noticeable improvement, whereas
about 19% perceived noticeable deterioration in the quality of trial advocacy. The remain-
ing 49% reported little or no change. Id. at 121.
The survey also considered whether incompetency of counsel prejudiced the right of
litigants in contested trials. Thirteen percent of the judges observed no prejudice, 44% re-
ported that the rights of the litigants had been significantly prejudiced in 58% or fewer of
their trials, and that only about 3% estimated prejudice of rights in 50% or more of their
trials. Id. at 122.
144. Id. at 145. Additional surveys have been completed concerning the current state
of trial advocacy, all of which draw conclusions from the Maddi report. For a detailed
description of these surveys and their implications on any aforementioned proposals for re-
form in the area of trial advocacy, see Cramton & Jensen, The State of Trial Advocacy and
Legal Education: Three New Studies, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1979).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Raife, 607 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1979). In Rogers a 21-year-old defendant,
motivated in part by economic considerations, opposed a disqualification motion by the gov-
ernment. The government argued that defendant's retained counsel, who was 84 years old
and suffering from hearing and other physical problems, was not competent to provide the
representation required of criminal defense counsel. Although the court acknowledged that
a defendant's right to retain counsel of his own choosing ordinarily should not be disturbed,
the court, after finding specific instances of misconduct, granted the motion noting:
Where the integrity of the judicial process is at stake the court must surely pos-
sess the power to take whatever steps are necessary to preserve the orderly
course of proceedings and to cure . . . "incipient miscarriage of justice develop-
ing before [our] eyes,". . . even if it means disqualifying an attorney from con-
tinuing his representation of a defendant.
471 F. Supp. at 854 (quoting United States v. Williams, 411 F. Supp. 854, 858 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)).
146. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 402 A.2d 1237 (D.C. 1979). In Pierce the defen-
dant's conviction for first-degree murder was reversed because the trial judge failed to con-
duct an on-the-record factual inquiry into an appointed counsel's pretrial request for co-
counsel. Under the scheme in the jurisdiction, counsel could have been substituted in "the
interests of justice" or co-counsel could have been appointed in "extremely difficult" cases.
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amine claims of ineffective assistance and must exercise its power and
responsibility to cure these instances of ineffectiveness when they arise.
Even the Supreme Court has admonished that "judges should strive to
maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are repre-
senting defendants in criminal cases in their courts. ' 147 Thus a trial judge
must, even in a "mockery of justice" jurisdiction, closely scrutinize the
conduct of counsel and stringently interpret and apply the standards of
effectiveness used in his jurisidiction."4
5
More specifically, the trial judge should: (1) inform counsel what
kind of preparation is expected of him at the time he makes his first ap-
pearance before the court on a particular case; (2) question defendants
who offer guilty pleas to determine whether their pleas are being
prompted by ineffective representation; (3) stop any proceeding in which
counsel makes a major or crucial mistake that could prejudice the defen-
dant's case;149 and (4) act independently and with discretion in whatever
manner is necessary to protect a defendant's rights from attorney compla-
cency and incompetency.150 The trial judge should exercise caution to
avoid abusing his discretion in his zeal to protect a defendant's right to
By failing to conduct a factual inquiry designed to determine if these conditions were pre-
sent, the court found that the trial judge had abdicated his responsibility to protect the
right of the accused to have the effective assistance of counsel. The dissent, however, felt
that the approach of the majority "grievously erodes the broad and historically vested dis-
cretion of trial judges." Id. at 1246 (Harris, J., dissenting). See also State v. Bush, - W.
Va. -, 255 S.E.2d 539 (1979). In Bush a defendant's conviction for forcible rape was re-
versed because the trial judge denied a motion for a continuance by defense counsel, leaving
counsel only three days after appointment to prepare for trial. Although the court's decision
rested largely on a state constitutional provision guaranteeing a continuance when the de-
fendant has not had a reasonable time to prepare a defense, the court noted:
[Tihe substantial and legitimate interest of the State on the prompt and effi-
cient administration of the criminal justice system, and the interests of criminal
defendants in the guarantee of a speedy trial cannot be allowed to erode the
fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial.
Id. at 547.
147. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (emphasis added).
148. See, e.g., Smith v. State, - Ind. -, 396 N.E.2d 898 (1979). In Smith the Su-
preme Court of Indiana, despite maintenance of a "mockery of justice" standard, reversed
and remanded for new trial a case in which the trial court erred in applying the standard.
149. For an interesting example of a case in which the trial judge should have immedi-
ately cured an obvious blunder by an attorney, see Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876
(5th Cir. 1978). In Sincox, while the jury was being polled, one juror indicated that he had a'
"reasonable doubt" about the defendant's guilt. The defendant's retained counsel, however,
failed to object. The court noted that "[c]ounsel's failure to do anything to protect the fun-
damental rights of his client was an inexcusable mistake of grand proportion." Id. at 879.
Accordingly, the court found that it was incumbent upon the trial judge either to order the
jury to retire for further deliberations or to dismiss the jury at this sensitive stage of the
proceeding. Since it was the trial judge who was conducting the polling, "it [was] he who
[was] in the best position to be aware of whatever happens." Id.
150. One commentator suggests that for trial courts to overcome their reluctance to
investigate and oversee attorney preparation, appellate courts must clearly define the ac-
tions trial judges can take to protect a defendant's rights. See Bazelon, The Realities of
Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811, 830 n.87 (1976).
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the effective assistance of counsel. 51
Although a trial judge should conduct a meaningful inquiry into a
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance, there should be no per se rule
branding such failure reversible error.1 52 The inflexibility of a per se rule
could result in erroneous determinations of ineffectiveness in some cases
and thereby create attorney wariness that might undermine the flexibility
necessary for effective representation.
Perhaps the ideal method of preventing claims of ineffectiveness
from ever arising is to provide performance standards. These standards
will guide attorneys in their courtroom conduct and, thereby, alleviate the
need for constant judicial inquiry into ineffectiveness claims. Chief Judge
Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit emphasized the need for per-
formance standards:
[1]n light of these shortcomings, efforts to upgrade the training of trial
lawyers or to provide them with post-graduate training must not dis-
place efforts to develop and enforce performance standards for defense
counsel. I admit that articulating standards for what is required of
counsel will be of little value if there are no lawyers competent enough
to follow the standards. Conversely, improving the training lawyers re-
ceive also will be of little value if we are unclear as to what defense
counsel must do, or not vigilant in assuring that the requirements are
met, even by reversing convictions if necessary. Far from being incom-
patible, the specialization and continuing education approaches, and
the development of clear standards for defense counsel, reinforce one
another'.ls
Judge Bazelon's emphasis on specific standards is appropriate to prevent
many incompetency claims from arising. Specific standards spotlight in-
competence arising from lack of preparation. Thus attorneys who prepare
properly before entering court will have little problem meeting specific
151. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 404 A.2d 162 (D.C. 1979). In Johnson the
trial judge, fearing the defendant would perjure himself, required the defendant to choose
between not testifying and taking the stand without the assistance of counsel and without
having his testimony argued to the jury. The court stated:
[I]t was improper for the trial court to interfere with counsel's conduct of the
trial and to compel appellant [to make such a choice] .... The right to testify
and the right to the assistance of counsel ... are not alternative rights. A crimi-
nal defendant is entitled to both and one cannot be made to substitute for the
other.
Id. at 165; see Jackson v. United States, 420 A.2d 1202 (D.C. 1979) (en banc) (trial court
order that defendant not discuss testimony with attorney during recess reversible error even
absent objection or show of prejudice).
152. See, e.g., Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1978). In Monroe a defen-
dant's conviction on multiple counts was sustained despite the failure of the trial judge to
make a meaningful inquiry into a claim of ineffective assistance. Although the court found
the failure to constitute error, the error was cured (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt) by
sua sponte declarations of defense counsel. The majority opinion, written by Chief Judge
Newman, is exceptionally thorough in its discussion of the standards and policy considera-
tions employed in the appellate review of ineffective assistance claims.
153. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811, 818 (1976).
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standards.
B. Curative Measures
Courts must assume a leading role in controlling ineffective represen-
tation by developing a definitive standard of attorney competence. The
various descriptive tests employed by the courts to measure claims of in-
effective representation have failed in many important respects.' 5' Many
of the faults of the existing tests can be eliminated by the courts through
a categorical approach to ineffective representation claims which enumer-
ates the steps a lawyer should take in defending a criminal case.155 Sev-
eral standards elucidating these steps, including the American Bar Asso-
ciation Standards Relating to the Defense Function,'
56 are available. 57
As a method by which appellate courts can assess the merits of effec-
tiveness claims, the categorical approach reflects the better view. Our le-
gal system demands of counsel as a minimum some reasonable quantum
of diligence and competence. This quantum requires only the absence of
gross neglect or incompetency, not perfection.58 The use of guidelines
provides notice of minimum standards not only to the profession but also
to potential victims of ineffectiveness. Finally, all else failing, specific
guidelines provide some objective parameters by which a trial court may
detect, and an appellate court assess, claims of ineffective assistance. To
154. See notes 40-49 supra and accompanying text.
155. In one of the seminal cases to measure an ineffectiveness claim against an enu-
meration of the duties of a defense counsel, Coles v. Peyton, the Fourth Circuit held that
the failure of the accused's public defenders to explain the elements of the crime to the
defendant, to interview witnesses and to investigate the reputation of the prosecutrix denied
the defendant his right to effective representation. 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U,S. 849 (1968). The court derived a list of duties of defense counsel from earlier Fourth
Circuit ineffectiveness decisions. Id. at 225. In sum, the court stated:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel
should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend an accused. Counsel must
confer with this client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise
him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential
defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both
factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to
allow enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.
Id. at 226.
For other embryonic attempts at enumeration, see Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256, 258
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) and State v. Ercolino, 65 N.J. Super. 20, 27-28, 166 A.2d 797, 803
(App. Div. 1961).
156. A.B.A., PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 141 (Approved Draft 1971). Several
state courts have used the ABA standards. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8-9, 539
P.2d 556, 560-62 (1975); State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St. 2d 71, 79, 341 N.E.2d 304, 310 (1976);
Baxter v. Rose, 253 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975); State v. Harper, 57 Wisc. 2d 543, 205
N.W.2d 1 (1973).
157. For a checklist to be used by counsel when preparing a case, see Report on the
Criminal Justice Act of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 36 F.R.D. 277, 338-
41 (1965).
158. See United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 205-10 (1976).
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the extent that each of these means is tailored to the end of ensuring
reasonable diligence and competence, the use of guidelines is beneficial.
Moreover, the use of guidelines promotes stability and predictability
in determinations of counsel incompetence. 159 Neither stability nor pre-
dictability, however, is sufficiently important to excuse an unwarranted
intrusion into the delicate area of defense counsel's professional judg-
ment.160 To prevent unwarranted intrusion, the categorical approach re-
quires that an injured defendant show a substantial violation of his right
to effective counsel. Even the most ardent categorical purist would agree
that the excusable or justifiable breach of a guideline does not constitute
error. 26 Under categorical theory, counsel may reasonably depart from
the guidelines, but counsel may not depart for reason of complacency or
incompetency. The use of guidelines provides a proper balance between
the interest in protecting the sanctity of professional judgment and the
interest in promoting effective representation.
The more moderate categoricalist would use the guidelines merely as
indications of what may be required to render effective assistance rather
than as minimum duties.162 This moderate position tips the balance to-
ward protecting the sanctity of professional judgment, but moderate use
of the guidelines still promotes reasonable competence. Thus, whether
guidelines operate as minimum duties or only as indications, they re-
present a meaningful addition to our legal system.
The categorical approach gives due consideration to the constitu-
tional rights of a party victimized by ineffective counsel. If a defendant
shows a substantial violation, he has established that he has been denied,
in some substantial respect, the effective assistance of counsel. To also
require the defendant to show the adverse consequences flowing from this
denial is to dismantle and reduce the substance of the sixth amendment
guarantee. 63 A party's showing that counsel's performance constituted a
159. The categorical approach will also increase the number of cases reversed for want
of the effective assistance of counsel. Relitigation of these cases will act as a catalyst to
stability and predictability and will have a significant prophylactic effect for several reasons:
First, to the extent that trial judges and prosecutors can prevent ineffectiveness
from tainting a plea or conviction, they will be encouraged to do so. Second,
insofar as ineffectiveness results from indifferent or incompetent lawyers, they
will be less likely to receive appointments. Third, in those jurisdictions where
ineffectiveness results largely from the unmanageable caseloads of appointed
counsel and public defenders, judges will be discouraged from overburdening
them. Finally, reversals are likely to attract the attention of the public and may
enhance the likelihood of legislative reform.
Id. at 293 n.145 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
160. See generally id. at 228-29 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
161. See, e.g., id. at 281-82 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (noting as "excusable" a "minor
error in an otherwise commendable performance" and as "justifiable" those transgressions
from the guidelines justified or mandated by "unique circumstances presented by a given
case").
162. See, e.g., id. at 250 n.44 (Robinson, J., concurring in result).
163. For a discussion of the sixth amendment right to effective counsel, see text ac-
companying notes 32-39 supra.
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substantial violation of competency standards should not be compro-
mised by speculation"6 ' nor, however, should it result in automatic rever-
sal. The categorical approach, by using the "harmless error" rule 65 upon
the showing of a substantial violation, appropriately defers to the consti-
tutional mandate of the sixth amendment and simultaneously provides a
mechanism by which frivolous claims can be forestalled.66
The Supreme Court has yet to squarely address the issue of in-
effective assistance arising from counsel's incompetence. Until the Court
speaks to the issue, lower federal and state courts will continue to use a
variety of approaches. These courts should, for the sake of preventing in-
justice, be urged to adopt the categorical approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal and state appellate courts must adopt a higher, uniform
standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
proper standard must, on a step-by-step basis, enumerate the basic acts
required to represent properly a criminal defendant from preliminary
hearing through sentencing, and must shift the burden of showing
prejudice to the government once the defendant has shown sufficient
cause.
A higher, uniform standard of review, such as the categorical ap-
proach, would offer several improvements in the review of ineffectiveness
claims: (1) notice to attorneys and clients of the professional performance
standards demanded of counsel; (2) objectivity in the appraisal of coun-
sel's performance in defending a client; (3) guidelines for trial court
judges by which they may monitor the performance of counsel who ap-
pear before them in the courtroom; (4) consistency and predictability in
the outcome of appellate reviews from one jurisdiction to another; (5) gui-
dance for professional and educational programs in fashioning means by
which to better prepare lawyers for practice under a higher standard of
professional conduct; and (6) eventual improvement in the overall quality
of representation offered by the legal community.
In addition to the imposition of a higher, uniform standard, review-
ing courts must become willing to reverse convictions on the ground of
164. Judge Bazelon's observations on leaving the consequences to speculation are per-
suasive. Speaking of the judgmental analysis of a defense counsel's failure to investigate, he
says, "The logic of their position seems to be as follows: If the accused was probably guilty,
then nothing helpful could have been found even through a properly conducted investiga-
tion. Thus, any violation of that duty-no matter how egregious-was inconsequential and
hence excusable." Id. at 286 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
165. The "harmless-error" rule "requires the beneficiary of a constitutional error to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The rule was first applied
in the context of ineffective representation claims by the Fourth Circuit in Coles v. Peyton,
389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). For a full discussion of the rule,
see notes 54-73 supra and accompanying text.
166. Only claims that amount to a substantial violation and that cannot be shown
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt require reversal.
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ineffective counsel, which will serve to deter trial judges from ignoring
ineffective performance. Trial judges who fail to scrutinize the perform-
ance of attorneys in their courts will be forced to retry cases that are
reversed on ineffectiveness grounds.
Realistically, however, no matter how vigilant the trial judge or the
reviewing court, and no matter how high the standard of trial perform-
ance is established, the problem of ineffective assistance of counsel can-
not be solved without a joint renewal of commitment to the problem by
the bench, bar, and public.
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167. For a discussion of the standards applied in this circuit, see notes 99-137 and
accompanying text supra.
168. Theodore v. New Hampshire, 614 F.2d 817 (lst Cir. 1980) (plaintiff failed to
demonstrate a specific instance of prejudice or conflict of interest; attorney not fettered in
cross-examination of prosecution witness whom he had represented in prior case); Dunker v.
Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503, 505 (1st Cir. 1974) (affirming trial court's test of "behavior of counsel
falling measurably below that which might be expected of an ordinary fallible lawyer"), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1003 (1975).
169. United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978) (it is sufficient if counsel is
prepared and conducts the defense with reasonable knowledge and skill and with an exercise
of knowledgeable choices of trial tactics).
170. United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d Cir. 1974) (failure to call
known witness, interview all 100 potential witnesses, visit scene of crime, challenge portions
of government's evidence, and make clear statement to judge did not require reversal).
171. United States v. Williams, 631 F.2d 198 (3d Cir. 1980) (defendant not denied
effective assistance when attorney disobeyed defendant's demand that certain affidavits be
used to impeach testimony of two key witnesses testifying against him; standard for effec-
tive assistance of counsel is "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which nor-
mally prevails at the time and place." Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir.
1970) (en banc)).
172. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc as to adoption of
McMann standard), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
173. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), (counsel for an indigent defendant
should be appointed promptly, must be afforded reasonable opportunity to prepare defense,
must confer with client without undue delay and as often as necessary to advise him of his
rights and ascertain available and unavailable defenses, and must conduct appropriate fac-
tual and legal investigations), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); see Bennett v. Maryland,
425 F.2d 181 (4th Cir.) (farce and mockery), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 881 (1970).
174. In United States v. Guerra, 588 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1979) the Fifth Circuit applied
a quasi-mockery of justice standard of effectiveness against retained counsel. "[I]n order to
establish a Sixth Amendment violation it must be shown that the incompetency of retained
counsel was so obvious that a reasonably attentive government official connected with the
criminal proceeding should have been aware of it and could have taken corrective action."
Id. at 521.
175. MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960) ("[wle interpret counsel to
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mean . . . counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assis-
tance"), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
176. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
177. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 876 (1975). Counsel appointed on day of trial is not so inevitably... unprepared
to go to trial ... ."Id. at 639.
178. United States v. Bad Cob, 560 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1977) (ineffective assistance
when failure to exercise customary skills and diligence).
179. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (counsel reasonably likely to
render reasonably effective assistance), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
180. Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980).
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181. Lewis v. State, 367 So. 2d 542 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 367 So. 2d 547
(Ala. 1979).
182. Green v. State, 579 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1978).
183. Haynie v. State, 27 Ark. 542, 518 S.W.2d 492 (1975).
184. Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying state law).
185. State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924
(1979).
186. People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979) (en banc).
187. People v. Grant, 40 Colo. App. 46, 571 P.2d 1111 (1977).
188. State v. Anonymous, 34 Conn. Supp. 656, 384 A.2d 386 (1978).
189. Isijola v. State, 340 A.2d 844 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
190. Kimbrough v. State, 352 So. 2d 925 (Fla. App. 1977).
191. Berryhill v. Ricketts, 242 Ga. 447, 249 S.E.2d 197 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
967 (1979).
192. State v. Kahalewai, 54 Hawaii 28, 501 P.2d 977 (1972).
193. State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 425, 546 P.2d 380 (1976).
194. People v. Bland, 67 I. App. 3d 716, 384 N.E.2d 1380 (1978). Although the stan-
dard applicable in determining whether defendant has received effective assistance of re-
tained counsel is whether counsel's conduct amounted to no representation at all or reduced
the proceedings to a farce or sham, standard applicable to appointed counsel is whether
there has been actual incompetency of counsel. Id.
195. Merida v. State, - Ind. ._, 383 N.E.2d 1043 (1979).
19811 EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
MALPRACTICE
STATE MOCKERY OF RANGE OF REASONABLY SPECIFIC

























196. State v. Veverka, 271 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1978).
197. State v. Pencek, 224 Kan. 725, 585 P.2d 1052 (1978).
198. Turner v. State, 208 Kan. 865, 494 P.2d 1130 (1972).
199. Bishop v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1977).
200. State v. Stripling, 354 So. 2d 1297 (La. 1978).
201. State v. Dutremble, 392 A.2d 42 (Me. 1978).
202. State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 347 A.2d 219 (1975).
203. Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 375 N.E.2d 681 (1978).
204. People v. Hanna, 85 Mich. App. 516, 271 N.W.2d 299 (1978) (articulating both an
enumeration and range of competence standard).
205. White v. State, 309 Minn. 476, 248 N.W.2d 281 (1976).
206. Parham v. State, 229 So. 2d 582 (Miss. 1969).
207. Seales v. State, 580 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1979). The court specifically followed the
reasonable competence of counsel standard adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Reynolds v.
Mabry, 574 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978).
208. State v. Miller, 173 Mont. 453, 568 P.2d 130 (1977).
209. State v. Fowler, 201 Neb. 647, 271 N.W.2d 341 (1978).
210. Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265, 578 P.2d 1183 (1978).
211. State v. McCarthy, 112 N.H. 437, 298 A.2d 740 (1972).
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212. State v. Bonet, 132 N.J. Super. 186, 333 A.2d 267 (1975).
213. State v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super. 507, 285 A.2d 234 (1971), modified, 60 N.J.
Super. 298, 290 A.2d 447 (1972).
214. State v. French, 92 N.M. 94, 582 P.2d 1307 (1978).
216. People v. Parliman, 56 A.D.2d 966, 393 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1977).
216. State v. Brooks, 38 N.C. App. 48, 247 S.E.2d 38 (1978).
217. State v. LaFramboise, 246 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1976).
218. State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St. 71, 341 N.E.2d 304 (1976).
219. Felts v. State, 588 P.2d 572 (Okla. Crim. 1978).
220. Rook v. Cup, 18 Or. App. 608, 526 P.2d 605 (1974).
221. Commonwealth v. Sisco, 482 Pa. 459, 393 A.2d 1197 (1978).
222. State v. Ambrosino, 114 R.L 99, 329 A.2d 398 (1974); State v. Turley, 113 R.L
104, 318 A.2d 455 (1974).
223. McCray v. State, 271 S.C. 185, 246 S.E.2d 230 (1978).
224. State v. Pieschke, 262 N.W.2d 40 (S.D. 1978).
225. Baxter v. Rose, - Tenn. ._, 523 S.W.2d 930 (1975).
226. Moultrie v. State, - Tenn. __, 542 S.W.2d 835 (1976).
227. Flores v. State, 576 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1978).
228. State v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utah 1978).
229. In re Cronin, 133 Vt. 234, 336 A.2d 164 (1975).
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230. Stayton v. Weinberger, 213 Va. 690, 194 S.E.2d 703 (1973).
231. State v. Cobb, 22 Wash. App. 221, 589 P.2d 297 (1978).
232. State ex rel. Wine v. Bordenkircher, - W. Va. , 230 S.E.2d 747 (1976).
233. State v. Harper, 57 Wis.2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
234. Adger v. State, 584 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1978).
235. Oesby v. United States, 398 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1977) (setting forth standard requiring
convicted defendant to show that counsel was grossly incompetent and that incompetence
blotted out essence of defense).
236. Ferrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755 (D.C. 1978) (right to counsel no less than
right to effective assistance of counsel within range of competency demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases).
237. United States v. Boesch, 584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978).
238. Government of Canal Zone v. Hodges, 589 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979) (performance
of appointed trial counsel so abysmal as to amount to ineffective assistance).

